Editor’s Note: What follows is part of a cross-blog survey that explores what Central Eurasia might look like fifteen years from now.
Cross-posted at Georgia and Azerbaijan. Comments will be hosted here.
In 2021 the oil will be flowing and Azerbaijan and Georgia will benefit. Georgia will continue to elect democratic leaders and Azerbaijan will continue to have corrupt leaders, supported by the U.S. government, who keep the oil pumping and aren’t wise enough to negotiate the terms of the agreements so that the money from the oil will benefit the population. The elite in Azerbaijan are richer and the army is bigger, but the average citizen hasn’t seen a lot of benefits from the oil. Meanwhile, in Armenia, an opening of the Turkish border is a gateway to the E.U. The border has opened in part because of European pressure on Turkey to get along better with its neighbor. The Armenian Genocide, while still not recognized by the Turkish government, is discussed in intellectual circles more and more. The Armenian leadership has not changed much, and like Azerbaijan, leaders base their legitimacy on the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Although the Kosovo earned sovereignty process has given the Armenian and Azerbaijani leadership a model to follow to allow Nagorno-Karabakh to exist as an independent state, the leadership has continued to not utilize this solution. In Georgia, the Kosovo earned sovereignty process will give greater hope to the breakaway regions and will create a situation in which political maneuvering will prolong Georgia’s troubles.
But first, it must be taken into consideration that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are small and their success or its failure depends greatly on their more powerful neighbors.
Some major regional issues upon which Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia’s futures depends (in no particular order):
- U.S.A. vs. Iran
o Armenia is greatly dependent on the United States for foreign aid. In 2006 this amount was $76.5 billion. This amount has decreased over the past years, due in part to U.S. government interest in Central Asia from the War on Terror.
o Armenia is also dependent upon Iran. Iran will supply gas to Armenia beginning in 2007.
o Ethnic Azerbaijanis in Northern Iran (Southern Azerbaijan) have been actively protesting this year [source] and some have even been arrested for peaceful protests. [source] This has been a growing issue for the past few years. [source] Azerbaijanis consist of possibly 24% of Iran’s population.
- E.U. and Turkey
o The E.U. and Turkey in 2021 will be entering its first year of work-force movement if Turkey enters the E.U. in 2014. One can only imagine what that will look like! [source]
- E.U. and NATO and South Caucasus
o The E.U. is focusing on Central Asia in 2007. [source] Will the Caucasus come around again after the 2005 European Neighbourhood Policy country reviews?
o The E.U. adopted an Armenian Action plan for the European Neighbourhood Policy. This is “one of the few recent topics that has met with apparent satisfaction from both the government and the opposition.” [source]
o Azerbaijan is the E.U.’s largest trading partner in the region. [source]
o Georgia is intensifying its discussions with NATO. [source] and [source]
- Georgia vs. Russia
o Although Putin has stated that there is no conflict between Russia and Georgia, [source] we know differently.
But the most important issue in the region is the UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS
- Georgia’s breakaway regions
o Saakashvili believes that he can bring together the breakaway regions of Georgia. [source]
- Nagorno-Karabakh
o In January there will be another meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers. [source]
A lot of what will happen in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh depends on the outcome of Kosovo’s independence. [more on Kosovo state status process] Kosovo’s “earned” sovereignty is the process of allowing an entity to prove that it is worthy of statehood. The following is excerpted from a study that I did of the earned sovereignty process with Nagorno-Karabakh.
STATE SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE EARNED SOVEREIGNTY RESOLUTION
One of the most common situations is when a people claim the right to self-determination, the larger entity of which it is a part argues for state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Recently a new idea has emerged to deal with such situations. Earned sovereignty is designed to create an opportunity for resolving such conflicts through managed devolution of sovereign authority and functions from a state to a substate entity and thereby promotes coexistence between a state and a people by establishing a power sharing agreement. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 354-355) Proponents of earned sovereignty say that it is neutral in the debate between self-determination and sovereignty (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355) and that earned sovereignty bridges the “sovereignty first” and “self-determination first” approaches and draw on their strengths while minimizing their disadvantages. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 385) As the sovereignty and self-determination arguments, according to proponents of earned sovereignty state, “have been reduced to little more than legal and political shields behind which states and substate entities justify their actions,”( P. Williams, J. Hooper and M. Scharf, Resolving Sovereignty Based Conflicts: The Emerging Approach of Earned Sovereignty 31 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy (2003). p. 349) finding a new way to determine the future status of a state had to emerge to resolve conflicts. The peoples or substate entities are guided through a process of transition to statehood or heightened autonomy in a way that does not undermine the legitimate interest of parent states and of the international community. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 350-351) Proponents of this strategy also state that earned sovereignty re-establishes security and promotes democracy and institution building. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355)
Sovereignty as a term has a “long and troubled history.” (J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1979). p. 26) In its common usage, sovereignty means “totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law” as residing in an independent territorial unit: the state. (J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1979). p. 26) Those states, entities, and individuals who generally believe sovereignty is more important than self-determination in determining a people’s status generally want to preserve their territorial integrity. They believe that the state has exclusive jurisdiction to exercise political power and authority within borders and has the right to exercise anything necessary to preserve its territorial integrity from threats. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 352) The international community often opts for sovereignty over self-determination as well. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 353) Those supporting sovereignty over self-determination often perceive earned sovereignty as “potential destabilizing to the current international order by promoting the separation of substate entities from their parent states.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 350-351)
Those states, entities, and individuals preferring self-determination are often secessionist movements and small states without significant minority populations. They believe that all self-identified groups with a coherent identity and connection to a defined territory are entitled to collectively determine their political destiny in a democratic way and should be free from persecution. Self-government is often realized through the creation of an autonomous province within the parent state and sometimes secession. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 353) They often perceive earned sovereignty as “a means for raising the bar for independence.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 351)
Proponents of earned sovereignty claim that these two positions can both be appeased by earned sovereignty because it is “an inherently flexible process implemented over a variable time period.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355) Earned sovereignty encourages a new view of sovereignty existing as a spectrum. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 374)
Earned sovereignty is defined by three core elements: one, shared sovereignty in which the state, or an international organization, and the substate entity both exercise some sovereign authority over a territory for a specified period of time (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355); two, institution building in which the substate entity undertakes to construct new institutions for self-government (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355), and three, determination of final status, in which the relationship between the state and the substate entity is determined with the consent of the international community. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355)
Earned sovereignty may also have three optional elements to increase the flexibility of the plan: one, phased sovereignty in which the substate entity gets increasing sovereign authority and functions over a specified period of time before the determination of final status (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356); two, conditional sovereignty in which the substate entity is required to meet certain benchmarks before it can acquire increased sovereignty (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356); and three, constrained sovereignty where there are continued limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356)
When the time comes to determine the final status of the substate entity, any type of internal or external self-determination could happen from substantial autonomy to full independence. This decision is often made through either some sort of referendum or in negotiations and usually involves the international community. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 365)
Many conflicts that involve the self-determination versus sovereignty debate have utilized earned sovereignty: East Timor (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356), Serbia and Montenegro (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 357), Northern Ireland (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 357), Bougainville and Papua New Guinea (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 358), Bosnia (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 358), Kosovo (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 358), Sudan (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 359), Israel and Palestine (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 359), and Western Sahara (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 360). There are many more self-determination versus sovereignty conflicts that are still unresolved; could earned sovereignty work in these cases as well?
EARNED SOVEREIGNTY SOLUTION
As Nagorno-Karabakh is a classic self-determination versus sovereignty issue, could earned sovereignty be the best route for this region? By examining what all three sides as well as other interested parties have stated as their desires, an earned sovereignty plan could emerge According to the International Crisis Group; the Armenian negotiators want to call for a settlement which would make explicit that status remains an open question. (Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace International Crisis Group Europe Report 167 11 October 2005. p. 12) This implies that the Armenian side is considering earned sovereignty as a possibility.
A group of international lawyers designed an earned sovereignty plan for the region and believe that their proposal is “designed to produce a phased resolution of the crisis with clear benchmarks for measuring compliance by the parties. If adopted and then implemented improperly, the proposal should lead to a final settle that promotes peaceful relations between Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, and Armenia.” (A Blueprint for Resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis, New England Center for International Law and Policy June 2000. p. 2) Peace talks in France during the second week of February 2005 in which earned sovereignty was proposed failed to bring any result.
EARNED SOVEREIGNTY IS NOT POSSIBLE
The failure is not with the earned sovereignty plan; rather it is the political concerns of the parties. As Williams and Pecci state, “given that the use of the earned sovereignty approach generally requires the consent of the state and substate entities that are party to a conflict, the precise dimensions of the approach as applied to a particular conflict are shaped by the political concerns of each party involved.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 351) The political concerns of leaders in unstable, nationalistic and corrupt states with opposition parties waiting in the lurches, biased media, multinational corporations (especially oil and gas companies), as well as a citizenry that must deal with military drafts, widows, orphans and refugees are perhaps too great at this time for an earned sovereignty plan to work. The leadership in both Armenia and Azerbaijan depends on the conflict for legitimacy. In Azerbaijan, the current leadership “owes its rise to power to skilful manipulation of popular protest over the handling of the Karabakh issue, and to loud pledges to resolve the conflict quickly and without losses to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan. A retreat from this position now would be dangerous and potentially threatening to government’s legitimacy.” (R. Musabayov, “The Karabakh conflict and democratization in Azerbaijan” in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) In Armenia “the dominating principle of the incumbent Armenian authorities’ foreign policy is to maintain, as long as possible, the current situation over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and preserve the fragile balance of forces in the South Caucasian region.” (D. Shahnazaryan, “New Challenges and Conflicts in South Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict as the Key Regional Conflict” Report from Armenia/the South Caucasus and Foreign Policy Challenges Conference, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor October 2004.)
Are these types of states and leaders in a position to resolve conflicts within its borders and “offer the necessary guarantees of rights to its former autonomous regions? (H. Tchilingirian, “New structures, old foundations: state capacities for peace” in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) The likely answer is no. Former OSCE Minsk Group co-chair Carey Cavanaugh stated after the failure of peace talks in 2001 that the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, “were ahead of their people,” (S. Freizer, “A last chance for peace?” in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) but a more likely explanation is that what the leadership says in privately during negotiations and what they say during public political rallies is extremely different. Post-Soviet elitism, secretiveness and centralization create a situation that allows the leadership to control the peace process and perhaps more importantly, information about its contents. “Autonomous civic initiatives to broaden debate on the conflict and specifically what can legitimately be said about it in public are regarded with suspicion, or worse, confronted with charges of ‘capitulation’.” (L. Broers in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) Until the leaderships can stop thinking about their own power and begin thinking about what is best for their people, an earned sovereignty approach cannot resolve the battle between the shields of self-determination and sovereignty that these leaders use to mask their true intentions. The political behaviour behind the masks is too deep and profitable for those involved in negotiations and therefore earned sovereignty, which could be a feasible solution, is not a current possibility for resolution.
4 hour JAZZ Concert at Casacade on the 15th of June 2007.
